Abstract. The i-protocol, an optimized sliding-window protocol for GNU UUCP, came to our attention two years ago when we used the Concurrency Factory's local model checker to detect, locate, and correct a non-trivial livelock i n v ersion 1.04 of the protocol. Since then, we h a v e repeated this veri cation e ort with ve widely used model checkers, namely, COSPAN, Mur', SMV, Spin, and XMC. It is our contention that the i-protocol makes for a particularly compelling case study in protocol veri cation and for a formidable benchmark of veri cation-tool performance, for the following reasons: 1 The i-protocol can be used to gauge a tool's ability to detect and diagnose livelock errors. 2 The size of the i-protocol's state space grows exponentially in the window size, and the entirety of this state space must be searched to verify that the protocol, with the livelock error eliminated, is deadlock-or livelock-free. 3 The i-protocol is an asynchronous, low-level software system equipped with a number of optimizations aimed at minimizing control-message and retransmission overhead. It lacks the regular structure that is often present in hardware designs. In this sense, it provides any v eri cation tool with a vigorous test of its analysis capabilities.
Introduction
Model checking CGP99 i s a v eri cation technique aimed at determining whether a system speci cation possesses a property expressed as a temporal logic formula. Model checking has enjoyed wide success in verifying, or nding design errors in real-life systems. An interesting account o f a n umber of these success stories can be found in CW96 .
In this paper, we report on our experience in using model checking|as provided by six widely used veri cation tools|to detect and correct a nontrivial livelock in a bidirectional sliding-window protocol. The tools in question are the Concurrency Factory CLSS96 , COSPAN HHK96 , Mur' Dil96 , SMV CMCHG96 , Spin HP96 , and XMC RRR + 97 , each of which supports some variety o f m o d e l c hecking.
The protocol that we i n v estigate, the i-protocol, is part of the GNU UUCP package, available from the Free Software Foundation, and is used for le transfers over serial lines. The i-protocol is part of a protocol stack; its purpose is to ensure ordered reliable duplex communication between two sites. At its lower interface, the i-protocol assumes unreliable lossy packet-based FIFO connectivity. To its upper interface, it provides reliable packet-based FIFO service. A distinguishing feature of the i-protocol is the rather sophisticated manner in which it attempts to minimize control-message and retransmission overhead. The GNU UUCP package also contains the g-and j-protocols, which are variants of the i-protocol.
A problem with the i-protocol, GNU UUCP version 1.04, was rst noticed by Stark, while trying to transfer large les from a remote computer to his home PC over a modem line. In particular, it appeared that, under certain message-loss conditions, the protocol would enter a confused" state and eventually drop the connection. In order to diagnose this problem, we extracted an abstract version of the i-protocol from its source code, consisting of approximately 1500 lines of C code. We formalized this abstraction of the protocol in VPL Value Passing Language, the textual speci cation language of the Concurrency Factory speci cation and veri cation toolset.
The VPL source of the i-protocol was then subjected to a series of model checking experiments using the Concurrency Factory's local model checker for the modal mu-calculus RS97 . This led us to the root of the problem: a livelock that occurs when a particular series of message losses drives the protocol into a state where the communicating parties enter into a cycle of fruitless message exchanges without any packets being delivered to the upper layer entities. Seeing no progress, the two sides close the connection, which m ust then be reestablished. If the communication line is su ciently noisy, or if one of the sides is slow in emptying communication bu ers, say due to disk waits, leading to bu er over ows, the chances of this scenario recurring are high, and can result in extremely poor performance.
Using the Concurrency Factory's diagnostic facility, w e w ere able to pinpoint and subsequently patch" the bug in the VPL code. The x to the protocol consists of a simple change in the way negative a c knowledgements are handled. The livelock error was xed independently by Ian Taylor, the i-protocol's original developer, in GNU UUCP version 1.05. We repeated our model-checking-based veri cation of the i-protocol with the COSPAN, Mur', Spin, SMV, and XMC veri cation tools, so that we could draw some comparisons between these tools on a real-life protocol. The i-protocol is particularly compelling as a case study in protocol veri cation and as a veri cation-tool performance benchmark for several reasons. First, the version we originally model checked has a bug, i.e. the livelock error, and hence the protocol can be used to gauge a tool's ability to uncover errors of this nature. In this case, we are more interested in debugging or refutation than in veri cation.
Secondly, the size of the i-protocol's state space grows exponentially in the window size, and the entirety of this state space will need to be searched to verify that the protocol, with the livelock error eliminated, is deadlock-or livelock-free. Finally, the i-protocol is an asynchronous, low-level software system equipped with a number of optimizations aimed at minimizing control-message and retransmission overhead. It lacks the regular structure that is often present in hardware designs. In this sense, it provides any v eri cation tool with a vigorous test of its analysis capabilities.
Our experimental results show that the special-purpose cycle-detection algorithms of Spin and COSPAN can be used to signi cant advantage to check for livelocks in complex systems like the i-protocol. SMV exhibited excellent memory-usage performance on all runs of window size 1, but failed to complete in a reasonable amount of time on any run of window size 2. This can most likely be attributed to exponential blowup in the BDD representation for window sizes greater than 1. Mur' and XMC performed the best on the i-protocol. In the case of Mur' this is due to the low-level nature of its speci cation language guarded commands and the succinct manner in which system states are encoded. XMC's strong performance is a consequence of the e ciency of the underlying tabled logic programming system, XSB XSB97 , and our use of partial evaluation to specialize the logical formula capturing livelock to the i-protocol's behavior. Our model-checking results are described more fully in Section 5 see Table 1 .
Although the Concurrency Factory was the tool we rst used to detect and diagnose livelock in the i-protocol, and it was able to do this for both window sizes 1 and 2, its CPU time usage was in general signi cantly higher in comparison with the other model checkers. The new release of the Factory, planned for January 1999, uses a more sophisticated scheme for encoding value-passing behavior of processes. We expect its performance to be on par with the other tools.
In related work, CCA96,Cor96 benchmark the performance of a variety of model checkers including SMV and Spin on Ada tasking programs. The major di erences between our study and theirs is in the application domain a real-life communication protocol vs. a suite of concurrency analysis benchmark programs and in the type of properties considered livelock vs. reachability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the salient features of the tools used in this case study. Section 3 gives a detailed account of the i-protocol, with an emphasis on how w e modeled the protocol for veri cation purposes. Section 4 describes the livelock that we discovered, and shows how a small change to the protocol e ectively eliminates this form of livelock. Section 5 summarizes the results of our model-checking experiments, and o ers a comparison of the tools' performance. Section 6 contains our concluding remarks.
We h a v e constructed a web site http: www.cs.sunysb.edu ~lmc iproto to serve as a central repository for our results. The site contains the source code of version 1.04 of the i-protocol, the patch t o t h e C c o d e t o x t h e l i v elock error, the encoding of the protocol in each of the input languages of the six tools, and various performance statistics generated by our benchmarking activity. F or each tool, these include the number of states explored, number of transitions traversed, CPU time usage, and memory usage see Table 1 .
The Veri cation Tools
In this section, we describe the most salient features of the tools we used in our analysis of the i-protocol.
The Concurrency Factory
In the context of our case study, the main features of the Concurrency Factory CLSS96 are its textual speci cation language, VPL, and its local model checker for the modal mu-calculus RS97 . VPL-supported data structures include integers of limited size and arrays and records composed of such i n tegers. A system speci cation in VPL is a tree-like hierarchy of subsystems. A subsystem is either a network or a process. A network consists of a collection of subsystems running in parallel and communicating with each other through typed channels. Simple statements of VPL are assignments of arithmetic or boolean expressions to variables, and input output operations on channels. Complex statements include sequential composition, if-then-else, while-do, and nondeterministic choice in the form of the select statement.
LMC, the Factory's local model checker, computes in an on-the-y fashion the product of a graph representation of the formula to be checked with the labeled transition system guaranteed to be nite-state underlying the VPL program. The number of nodes of the product graph explored by LMC is further minimized through the use of partial-order reduction. This technique eliminates from consideration those portions of the state space resulting from redundant interleavings of independent e v ents. LMC is also equipped with diagnostic facilities that allows the user to request that the contents of the depth-rst search stack be displayed whenever a certain signi cant e v ent" occurs e.g. when the search rst encounters a state at which a logical variable is determined to be either true or false and to play i n teractive games for the full modal mu-calculus.
2.2 COSPAN COSPAN HHK96 is a model checker for synchronous systems based on the theory of !-automata. The system to be veri ed is speci ed as an !-automaton P , the task the system is intended to perform is speci ed as an !-automaton T , and veri cation consists of the automata language containment test LP LT. P is typically given as the synchronous parallel composition of component processes, speci ed as !-automata. Asynchronous composition can be modeled through nondeterministic delay in the components.
Language containment can be checked in COSPAN using either a symbolic BDD-based algorithm or an explicit state-enumeration algorithm. Both algorithms are on-the-y." COSPAN also supports a notion of recur edge" and can check whether in every execution of the system the recur edge occurs in nitely often. We used this facility to detect livelock in the i-protocol.
Systems can be speci ed in COSPAN using the S R language, which supports nondeterministic, conditional i.e., if-then-else v ariable assignments; variables of type bounded integer, enumerated, Boolean, and pointer; arrays and records; and integer and bit-vector arithmetic. Modular hierarchy, scoping, parallel and sequential execution, homomorphism declaration and general !-automaton fairness are also available. COSPAN also provides an error tracing facility that allows the user to back-reference from the error track t o the S R source.
Mur'
The Mur' veri cation system consists of the Mur' compiler and the Mur' description language. The Mur' compiler generates a special-purpose veri er from a Mur' description. The Mur' description language uses a set of iterated guarded commands, like Chandy and Misra's Unity language CM88 . A Mur' description consists of constant and type declarations, variable declarations, procedure declarations, rule de nitions, a description of the start state, and a collection of invariants. Each rule is a guarded command consisting of a condition and an action. The condition is a boolean expression and the action is a sequence of statements. An invariant is a boolean expression that is desired to be true in every state. When an invariant is violated, an error message and error trace are generated.
Mur' is able to verify liveness speci cations written in a subset of Linear Time Temporal Logic LTL. Liveness speci cations are expressed using keywords ALWAYS, EVENTUALLY, and UNTIL, and are checked under the assumption that every rule is weak-fair unless declared otherwise. We used this facility o f Mur' to encode and check for livelock in the i-protocol.
SMV
SMV CMCHG96 is an automatic tool for model checking CTL formulas. CTL can also be used to specify simple fairness constraints. The transition relation of the system to be veri ed is represented implicitly by boolean formulas, and implemented by BDDs. This allows SMV to verify models having more than 10 20 states. SMV also has a diagnostic facility that produces a counterexample when a formula is not true.
An SMV program can be viewed as a system of simultaneous equations whose solution determines the next state. Asynchronous systems, such as the i-protocol, are modeled by de ning a set of parallel processes whose actions are interleaved arbitrarily in the execution of the program. As in Mur' liveness speci cations, such as absence of livelock, are given in a form of temporal logic CTL.
2.5 Spin Spin HP96 i s a m o d e l c hecker for asynchronous systems speci ed in the language Promela. Safety and liveness properties are formulated using LTL. Model checking is performed on-the-y and with partial-order reduction, if speci ed by the user. Moreover, model checking can be done in a conventional exhaustive manner, or, when this proves to be impossible due to state explosion, with an e cient approximation method based on bitstate hashing. With a careful choice of hashing functions, the probability of an exhaustive proof remains very high.
Besides being able to specify correctness properties in LTL, the Promela speci cation language includes two t ypes of labels that can be used to de ne two complementary types of liveness properties: acceptance and progress. We used Spin's ability to check for this latter type of formula to detect livelock i n the i-protocol.
Promela is a nondeterministic guarded-command language with in uences from Hoare's CSP and the language C. Promela includes support for data structures, interrupts, bracketing of code sections for atomic execution, the dynamic creation of concurrent processes, and a variety of synchronous and asynchronous message passing primitives. Message passing is via channels with arbitrary numbers of message parameters.
2.6 XMC XMC RRR + 97 is a model checker for a value-passing process calculus and the modal mu-calculus. It is written in under 200 lines of XSB tabled Prolog code. XSB XSB97 is a logic programming system developed at SUNY Stony Brook that extends Prolog-style SLD resolution with tabled resolution. The principal merits of this extension are that XSB terminates on programs having nite models, avoids redundant subcomputations, and computes the well-founded model of normal logic programs.
Systems to be veri ed in XMC are encoded in the XL language, a valuepassing language similar in many w a ys to Milner's CCS. A distinguishing feature of XL is its support for a generalized process pre x operator, which allows arbitrary Prolog terms to appear as pre xes. This construct allows the XL programmer to take advantage of XSB's substantial data-structuring facilities to describe sequential computation on values.
Properties such as the possibility of livelock are expressed as modal mucalculus formulas. The encoding of the semantics of the mu-calculus in XMC can be specialized JGS93 with respect to a given formula. For the livelock formula used in the veri cation of the i-protocol, specialization yields a logic program that implements an e cient cycle-detection algorithm, and leads to improved performance.
Modeling the i-Protocol
In this section we give a detailed account of the i-protocol, describing how w e modeled it for veri cation purposes. To allow the reader to follow our description of the protocol more closely, w e provide VPL-style pseudo-code in Appendix A and intermittently refer to line numbers from the pseudo-code.
The i-protocol is a sliding window protocol, but with some optimizations, to be described later, aimed at reducing the acknowledgement and retransmission tra c. The window size, among other steady-state" protocol parameters, such as data packet size, line quality and error handling parameters, timeout values, acknowledgement high watermarks, and data and message bu er sizes, is decided at the parameter negotiation stage during connection set-up. Since we are concerned with the data transfer properties of the protocol, we do not model the stages involved in connection set-up, parameter negotiation, error and linequality monitoring, and connection shutdown. In particular, the window size for our model is a parameter that is xed at compile time."
The protocol is intended to provide reliable, full duplex, FIFO service to its upper interface, given a full duplex, unreliable, FIFO packet-based communication service by its lower interface. It is convenient t o imagine each side as consisting of two halves | a sender half that sends data packets to, and receives acknowledgements from, the receiver half on the other side, and a receiver half that receives data packets from, and sends acknowledgements to, the sender half on the other side. To allow for communication latency, the sender can send several packets without waiting for acknowledgements. If the window size is W , then the sender can have u p t o W contiguous packets unacknowledged at any time. These packets are stamped with sequence numbers when received from the upper layer; sequence numbers range from 0 to SEQ , 1.
The i-protocol, as implemented in GNU UUCP, uses a xed value of SEQ = 32, and is intended for window sizes up to, but not exceeding, 16. As discussed below, however, this bound is not essential, and using a sequence space of SEQ, a window size of up to bSEQ=2c can be supported.
To cut down on the acknowledgement tra c, the receiver can piggyback its acknowledgements on top of normal data, or other control tra c. When both sides are exchanging data packets, this is often su cient t o k eep the connection going without the need for explicit acknowledgements. However, when a side is only receiving data, it needs to send explicit acks. In this case, as an optimization, acks are sent only at half-window boundaries, i.e., one for every dW=2e packets received.
The sender half" uses the following main state variables, each of which ranges over SEQ. A v ariable sendseq is used to stamp the next user-level message from the upper layer. Its value gives the upper edge exclusive of the sender's active window." The variable rack is used to keep track o f a c knowledgements from the remote, and its value gives the lower edge exclusive of the sender's active window. At our level of abstraction, the data contents of a packet are not modeled, and so the sender does not explicitly bu er unsent messages 1 . The main data structures used by the receiver half are as follows. A variable recseq is used to record the sequence number up to, and including which, all packets have been successfully received from the remote, and delivered to the upper layer. The variable lack records the sequence number up to which an acknowledgement, either explicit via an ack or implicit via a piggybacked acknowledgement in a data or nak packet, has been most recently sent to the remote. The receiver's active window consists of the sequence numbers from lack + 1 through lack + W modulo SEQ. 2 A boolean array recbuf of size SEQ indicates the sequence numbers in this window that have been received out of order and are being bu ered for returning to the upper layer. This bu ering is required in order to deliver packets in the correct order to the upper layer. Another boolean array nakd is used to remember the sequence numbers that have recently been negatively acknowledged. As in the case of the sender, the receiver does not explicitly bu er packets, recording only whether a message has been received from the remote, but not yet delivered to the upper layer.
The protocol initialization code sets lack, rack and recseq to 0, sendseq to 1, and all entries in the arrays nakd and recbuf to false. The protocol's main loop lines 2 10 consists of busy waiting for one of the following events to occur, and taking appropriate actions as described: E1: a packet arrival line 31 over the communication link lower layer interface: the packet is rst checked for header checksum errors line 32, and silently discarded line 33 if it has a header error. Otherwise, if the piggybacked acknowledgement is for a sequence number in the sender's active window, this is used to update lines 93 96 rack. This subsumes the handling of explicit ack packets line 39. If the received packet is a nak for a sequence number in the sender's active window, the requested data packet is resent lines 100 106. If the received packet is a data packet, its data checksum is rst veri ed line 45. If the data is found corrupted, and the packet's sequence number is in the receiver's active window, it has not been previously received, and has not been negatively acknowledged since the previous timeout, then a nak is sent for that sequence number lines 47 54. If, on the other hand, the data is valid, and the packet number is the rst in its active window bears the sequence number recseq + 1, then the newly arrived packet is delivered to the upper layer line 59. Furthermore, any later packets that have been bu ered, and all of whose predecessors" have been delivered to the upper layer, are also returned, in order, to the upper layer lines 61 66. At each point, recseq is appropriately incremented, thus shifting up the active window lines 58 and 62.
If it is subsequently found that dW=2e or more packets have been received since the last ack implicit or explicit was sent, an explicit ack is generated for recseq, and lack appropriately updated lines 67 73. If, however, the sequence numb e r o f t h e newly arrived data packet is not equal to recseq + 1, meaning that there are some missing sequence numbers in between, the newly arrived packet is bu ered in recbuf , if not already received lines 74 75, and naks generated for all earlier" missing packets, for which a nak has not been sent since the last timeout lines 76 87.
E2: a user request line 14 to send a new message upper layer interface: The sender rst checks line 15 if there is an opening in its active window i.e., that the active window size is less than W . If there is an opening, the new message is transmitted, after being assigned the next new sequence number sendseq, and the sender's active window's upper edge" suitably adjusted lines 22 27. If, however, the sender's window is full, it must wait for an opening created by the receipt of an ack, see above, before it can send the new message. In this case, it busy-waits in a loop, waiting line 17 for the arrival of a new packet see E1 above, or line 19 for the occurrence of a timeout see E3 below. E3: a timeout line 118: The nakd bu er is rst cleared line 119, signaling that fresh naks may need to be sent out. If there is no packet in the receive bu er from the lower interface, then the receiver sends a nak for the earliest" missing sequence numberrecseq + 1 in its active window lines 123 128. Further, the sender resends the oldest" message if one exists in its active window, for which it has not received an acknowledgement from the remote lines 129 134. If, on the other hand, there is a packet available from the lower interface line 121, we follow E1 above.
The medium is modeled, in the usual manner, as a lossy FIFO bu er, one for each direction of communication. Each packet has a data and header checksum eld, which are nondeterministically reset by the medium to model corruption of the data or header.
Our model of the i-protocol was derived from the C-code of the implementation, and involved a number of abstractions aimed at reducing the protocol's state space. One such abstraction reduces the message sequence space from a xed value of SEQ = 32 a de ned constant in the GNU implementation to the value 2W when using a window size of W . Indeed, with a sequence space of SEQ = 32, a system consisting of just the receiver half of the protocol on one side and the sender half of the protocol on the other, connected by a single-bu er communication medium in either direction, would have an estimated state space of about 2:7 10 14 , e v en with a window size of 1. In actuality, though, many o f these con gurations are observationally equivalent Mil89 to one another, and by using a sequence space of 2W , this number can be reduced. For instance, for the case W =1, the estimated state space shrinks dramatically to about 1:610 7 , a reduction by almost a factor of 10 7 .
Livelock Error
The livelock error detected rst using the Concurrency Factory, and subsequently using COSPAN, Mur', SMV, Spin and XMC, is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of W = 2 , medium bu er capacity 1, and assuming that one side acts as sender and the other as receiver. Initially, data1 sent b y the sender is successfully received by the receiver, which responds with ack1. This ack is dropped by the medium. The sender then sends data2, which is also lost. The sender then enters its timeout procedure, and sends nak1 and resends data1. These and all subsequent packets are correctly delivered by the medium. Meanwhile, the receiver also times out, but nding the messages, nak1, data1, in its receive bu er, processes them. However, it silently ignores nak1, since it has never sent a data packet with sequence number 1. It also ignores data1, since 1 is not in its current receive window. This cycle can now repeat forever, with the sender sending messages to the receiver, which the receiver ignores, resulting in no messages being accepted from, or delivered to, the upper layer in spite of the medium behaving perfectly from this point o n w ards. The livelock error arises because there is no ow of information from the receiver to the sender regarding the sequence numbers up to which the receiver has received all messages. A simple x for this problem consists of sending an up-to-date ack, on the receipt of a nak for sequence numbersendseq, provided that the active send window is empty. The x appears as lines 107 114 in the VPL listing of the protocol. With this x the model checker was unable to nd any livelocks in the protocol.
Model-Checking Results
As discussed in the Introduction, the i-protocol makes for a formidable case study for veri cation tools, and forms the basis for an interesting comparative study. Table 1 contains the performance data obtained by applying COSPAN version 8.15, Mur' version 3.0, SMV version 2.4, Spin version 2.9.7, and XMC to the i-protocol. Results are given for W =1 and W =2, with the livelock error present ~ xed and not present xed, and with a medium that can only drop messages mini versus one that can also corrupt messages full. All results were obtained on an SGI IP25 Challenge machine with 16 MIPS R10000 processors and 3GB of main memory. Each individual execution of a veri cation tool, however, was carried out on a single processor with 1.9GB of available main memory.
A few comments about Table 1 are in order. On some runs, memory was exhausted before the veri cation e ort could complete. This is indicated in the Completed?" column. The timing gures given in the table are wall-clock" time rather than cpu time. This makes a di erence in exactly one instance, W =2 full xed for XMC, where 4.7GBytes of virtual memory are used. In this case, the wall-clock time is perceptively higher than the cpu time. Some table entries are left blank. This is because the corresponding data was unavailable because the tool does not provide it e.g., the number of transitions, in the case of SMV or because the tool failed to terminate on the run in question. The number of states reported by SMV is the total numberofreachable states. The other tools give the number of explored states. Finally, the results for the Concurrency Factory are not included in the table. As mentioned in Section 1, this will change with the new release of the Factory.
As can be gleaned from the results of Table 1 , the special-purpose cycledetection algorithms of Spin and COSPAN served them well. In particular, these tools were able to complete analysis of several complex versions of the i-protocol, including W = 2 mini ~ xed, W = 2 mini xed, and W = 2 full ~ xed. The ability to specify atomically executed code sections in Spin also proved e ective, enabling Spin to complete analysis of the W = 1 full xed version. Spin, however, ran out of memry for W =2 full xed, despite the use of partial-order reduction and bitstate hashing with 98 state-space coverage.
SMV exhibited excellent memory-usage performance on all runs of window size 1, but failed to complete in a reasonable amount of time on any run of window size 2. This is most likely due to an exponential blowup in the BDD representation for window sizes larger than 1. The dynamic variable reordering option of SMV was used on all runs reported in Table 1 . Several static variable orderings were also tried, including a sequential" ordering in which the variables of the sender precede the variables of the sender-to-receiver medium, which precede the variables of the receiver, etc. An interleaved" ordering, in which the components' variables were strictly interleaved, was also attempted. In all cases, the dynamic reordering signi cantly outperformed the static ones.
Mur' and XMC performed the best on the i-protocol, completing on all cases of interest. Mur' uniformly exhibited superior memory-usage behavior over all the other tools, due in part to the low-level nature of its speci cation language guarded commands and the succinct manner it encodes system states. Mur' was also fast. XMC, however, was faster than Mur' for all cases in which the livelock error was present. This is because of the local, top-down nature of XMC's model-checking algorithm Mur' is a global model checker. Prior experience RRR + 97 indicates that the space requirements of XMC can be reduced through source-level transformations aimed at optimizing the representation of process terms. Finally, the number of states transitions explored by XMC is appreciably lower in comparison with the other systems. This is primarily due to XMC's use of lazily evaluated logical variables to represent v ariables and data structures in the speci cation, and the fact that XMC treats sequences of pure computation steps as atomic.
Conclusions
We have shown how an actual bug in a real-life communications protocol can be detected and eliminated through the use of automatic veri cation tools supporting model checking. We h a v e also tried to demonstrate the i-protocol's effectiveness as a veri cation-tool benchmark by conducting a comparative study of the performance of six widely used veri cation tools in analyzing the original and livelock-free versions of the protocol. Pertinent future work includes recruiting the actual developers of the model checkers used in this study to encode and analyze the i-protocol. We expect that the performance of each tool will increase under these conditions and it would be interesting to learn what tricks" the developers employ to attain this improvement.
For completeness, other properties of the i-protocol should be checked besides the absence of livelock, such as deadlock-freedom and eventual message delivery. It would be particularly interesting to apply a tool with deductive reasoning capabilities, such as PVS ORR + 96 , to the i-protocol, so that a parameterized version of the protocol window size, bu er size, etc. could be analyzed.
Finally, w e i n vite developers of veri cation tools besides those considered in this case study to try their hand at the i-protocol and report the results to us for posting on the i-protocol web site. This will assist protocol developers and other software engineers interested in pursuing automated veri cation to make an educated decision about which tool is right for the task at hand.
